Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Honors College Theses

Pforzheimer Honors College

8-1-2006

The Effects of Corporate and International Culture
on Achieving and Maintaining Strong Corporate
Governance
Cindy Saad
Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/honorscollege_theses
Recommended Citation
Saad, Cindy, "The Effects of Corporate and International Culture on Achieving and Maintaining Strong Corporate Governance"
(2006). Honors College Theses. Paper 28.
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/honorscollege_theses/28

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Pforzheimer Honors College at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Honors College Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact
rracelis@pace.edu.

Saad 1
The Effects of Corporate and International Culture on Achieving and Maintaining Strong
Corporate Governance
Abstract
The issue of implementing strong corporate governance has grown immensely in
recent years, and has shifted the way organizations structure their decisions, from board
composition to reporting and compliance processes. In light of the numerous scandals
ranging from Enron to WorldCom, among others stemming from the dot.com boom and
bust of 2000, some steps have been taken to restore investor and regulator confidence,
Sarbanes-Oxley being the most popular phrase relative to corporate governance concerns
here in the United States. Compliance and regulatory reporting have come to the forefront
of firm priorities, but there are still implications for achieving strong corporate
governance that need further solution development. The implication I will be exploring in
this paper is twofold, that of the affect of culture on influencing, and the implications for
establishing and maintaining good corporate governance. The aspect of corporate culture
will be discussed, and then the more globally related subject of international culture, the
cultural dimensions, and the implications they pose for global firms for achieving strong
corporate governance. Findings on corporate and international culture relative to
corporate governance will be based on the five elements of corporate governance to
manage strategic risk, by Drew, Kelley and Kendrick, among other factors relevant to
investors.
1. Introduction to Corporate Governance
In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in the United States, providing the
costly but necessary need for more senior executive oversight toward risk and extensively
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detailed reporting, as well as more streamlined processes. Of course, we live in a
globalized market, and so the need to develop stronger oversight extends well beyond the
United States. In the United Kingdom, the Turnbell Report achieves the same purpose, as
does the European Commission’s agenda. While these are just some steps toward
changing the way companies view and implement good corporate governance and
adopting the priority of ethics as a firm value, they still do not speak to managing risk in
terms of firm success, competition and a myriad of other important aspects, but after all,
this is a beginning of a worldwide business reform that still has a long way to go.
Corporate governance has been given many definitions and can be seen from
several perspectives. For instance, economists define corporate governance as “the
institutions that influence how business corporations allocate resources and returns” (O’
Sullivan, 2000) and “the organizations and rules that affect expectations about the
exercise of control of resources in firms” (World Bank, 2002). As Salacuse points out,
corporate managers, investors, policy makers and lawyers view corporate governance
even more specifically as “…the system of rules and institutions that determine the
control and direction of the corporation and that define relations among the corporation’s
primary participants- the shareholders, board of directors, and company management”
(Monks and Minows, 1995).
There are variations in industries and how they distinctly model their businesses
and operations, there are variations in cultures across the world and the values and
priorities each tend to attach to certain behaviors and business practices, so naturally, it
would be a daunting challenge to establish one set of rules that can be applied to all.
However, steps can be taken to at least provide guidelines and understanding of what
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certain cultural values imply, what particular behaviors stem from, and suggestions for
responding to such implications that may arise in the efforts to establishing and
maintaining good corporate governance. As Gandossy and Sonnenfeld (2005) state,
“good governance cannot be legislated even though vague guidelines can exacerbate bad
governance”. Similarly, cookie-cutter governance templates would be impractical and
would not accommodate globally sensitive standards. The Securities and Exchange
Commission chief Donaldson expresses this concern best:
“I believe we should go slowly in mandating specific structures and committees
for all corporations…there are vast differences in the function, structure and
business mandate of the thousands of corporations struggling with the issues of
good corporate governance. I believe that these differences dictate that once the
board determines the ethical culture that is to prevail, each company board should
be afforded a level of flexibility to create their own approach to its structure…to
insist on one rule for all belies the dynamics of the fast changing business and
corporate environs and the nature of varied business situations” (Gandossy and
Sonnenfeld, 2005).
Donaldson also states that one of the most interesting evaluations of boards he’s ever read
was conducted by an organizational behaviorist, which is fitting as many of the aspects of
corporate governance discussed in this paper deal with social and human interactions and
belief systems, in a corporate and national cultural context. While certain controls within
firms are quantitative and can be measured against standards, benchmarks and
requirements, controls for human behavior and interaction are naturally qualitative, and
are extremely different, requiring very different considerations.
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Drew, Kelley and, Kendrick (2006) present five elements of corporate governance
relevant to managing strategic risk. Strong corporate governance can be achieved by
managing strategic risk properly, and upon closer inspection of the various ailments that
caused the failures of companies such as WorldCom, Enron, and Lucent, among many
others, clearly, the poor judgment and management of strategic risk by top executives and
managers contributed greatly to their troubles. Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick organize the
elements of corporate governance into a five-element model comprised of: Culture,
Leadership, Alignment, Systems, and Structure (hereby referred to as CLASS).
According to Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick, the five elements cannot stand alone,
and instead exist in an interrelated and interdependent relationship. They argue that
corporate culture is shaped and influenced by the firm’s leadership, and similarly,
systems support structure, thereby also shaping corporate culture. The element of
alignment serves to harmonize all five elements in an, and so culture is also reinforced by
the firm’s leadership, and systems reinforce culture. According to Sison (2000),
“corporate culture” relates to “national culture” via the “…shared values of their
members and citizens, respectively”.
2. Corporate culture relative to risk
A firm’s corporate culture provides a framework of the values and social norms
within which managers and other employees derive their behavior and performance
patterns from and operate in; corporate culture, therefore, influences strategy, decisionmaking ability, and judgment. Nowadays firms encourage employees to pursue the role
of team player, and if the culture of the company encourages engaging in questionable
business practices to achieve certain target and performance objectives, a manager may
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be inclined, and pressured, to do as senior executives expects from him or her, for fear of
implications for his or her career growth and even sustained employment with the firm.
Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick refer to such a threatening environment as the cultural
intolerance for failure, and further explain that this type of corporate culture will lead to
excessive risk-taking, rule-bending, and system manipulation.
Another corporate culture characteristic that would adversely affect performance
behavior is that of one that encourages profit chasing through any means necessary, a
behavior pattern that at times might be motivated by such things as performance
incentives, for example, bonuses, tremendous pay packages, and company perks (loans,
aircraft, et cetera). Such materialistic incentives contribute largely to forming a shortterm vision focus for employees, according to Castellano and Lightle (2005). Gandossy
and Sonnenfeld refer to this as “golden shackles”, a term for the great financial
temptation and pressure to overlook wrongdoing. Excessive internal rivalry may also lead
to poor judgment and decision making, since the manager is not acting in accordance
with the company’s goals but his or her own relative to outperforming fellow employees;
internal rivalry may be caused by pressure to make the numbers, as stated by Castellano
and Lightle. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Gandossy and Sonnenfeld (2005),
employees are recognized for their performance and dollar savings, but not very often for
being careful.
Gandossy and Sonnenfeld (2005) discuss a culture with the tendency for the diffusion
of responsibility of seeing and acting upon wrongful practices and behavior. Diffusion of
responsibility is caused by “Bystander apathy, the division of responsibility between
specialists and organizations, obedience to the authority and professional codes of
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conduct…” (Gandossy and Sonnenfeld, 2005). This type of corporate culture will not
prioritize accountability and would result in the oversight of information needing much
attention that may prevent business failures and disasters. The concentration of vital
information in few hands and lack of information sharing is also destructive to
companies, as it not only allows room for devious motives and actions, but also creates a
corporate culture of alienation and detachment of employee to firm. Instead of feeling a
part of and performing in a team environment, a manager may feel exclusive from the
firm and its activities, and such discouragement might result in the pursuit of selfinterests at the firm’s expense.
The persecution of whistle blowers will discourage managers from voicing concern
over potential problems within the firm, creating a fear driven working environment, and
affecting performance significantly. According to Gandossy and Sonnenfeld (2005),
whistleblowers all too often meet resistance and conflict in response to their actions, due
to the challenging of the “…deniability some seek in an effort to hide within the layers of
the command structure”. According to Simms (2003), some corporations do not embrace
the concept of whistleblowing because they feel it will only be an outlet for anonymous
complaining or “mischief making or may lead to a culture of denunciation”. Other firms,
where the culture promotes cosiness and familiarity and everyone knows each other, feel
they have no need for whistle blowing policies. However, this only makes it harder to
report unethical corporate practices, as employees have no resources to reach out to, and
the underlying problems will eventually simply snowball beyond the firm’s control,
making it too late to take any corrective action. The negative attitude toward whistle
blowing is due to the approach firms at times have taken with such policy. They have
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presented it as a “defensive measure, rather than as part of good corporate governance
and corporate social responsibility”, according to Guy Dehn in Simm’s article.
Overall, potential cultural characteristics of firms that Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick
state can be counterproductive to achieving good corporate governance and risk
management are summarized as follows:
•

Unethical behavior

•

Excessive internal rivalry

•

Intolerance of failure

•

Propensity for risk-taking

•

Secretiveness

•

Persecution of people who speak up (“whistle blowers”)

Therefore, in pursuing the attainment of strong corporate governance, it is crucial for a
firm to hold corporate culture’s affect on performance as a top priority, and build on such
an initiative through various employee programs that promote and solidify an established
culture that encourages positive work behavior. Castellano and Lightle propose the use of
cultural audits performed by an outside firm every three years as a way to monitor,
discover and improve corporate culture relative to employee performance, as well as
external audits to assess the “tone at the top”. According to Castellano and Lightle, the
three main areas that the cultural audit would explore would include:
* The degree to which preoccupation with meeting the analysts' expectations permeates
the organizational climate;
*The degree of fear and pressure associated with meeting numerical goals and targets;
and
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* The compensation and incentive plans that may encourage unacceptable, unethical, and
illegal forms of earnings management.
Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick suggest the following ways to alleviate cultural weaknesses
within firms:
*Implementing new and stronger controls;
*Restructuring incentive systems;
*Educating employees;
*Creating communication programs; and
*Providing individual and team coaching
Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick also discuss the element of Leadership as part of the
five element model for corporate governance, which is crucial in developing values,
ethical character in followers, culture, and organization-building. Leadership is described
by Ty Warren (2005) as no longer being of the command and control nature as it was in
American business for years. Furthermore, Warren states that 40 percent of corporate
productivity flows from "people skills" rather than "task skills”, and so task skills are
more useful than hard skills in developing not only followers, but future leaders.
Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick refer to Professor Conger (1990, 1999), and his
description of the “dark side of leadership” (1990, pg. 10), which asserts that the very
same characteristics that help people rise to become leaders may also lead to their
demise. The focus here is on charismatic leadership as an example. Charismatic
leadership may potentially cause over commitment to a particular vision, preventing other
ideas and perspectives from being brought to the table. It may also cause followers to
become dependent and put leaders up on pedestals, as well as contribute to the ever
frustrating problem of groupthink, in which group members simply agree with their
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leader as opposed to formulating and expressing their own distinct point of view and
decision making insight.
Gandossy and Sonnenfeld define groupthink as “…submissiveness to the firm,
industry or profession’s culture at all costs…” caused by the pressures of an all around
tolerance for unethical behavior within the corporation (2005). An example of this is the
methods by which managers attempt to soften the seriousness of certain crimes and
unethical practices via the manipulative use of language, a skill that would usually come
easily and naturally to charismatic leaders, such as the use of “double hocking”, “doublediscounted” loans and “dipsy-doodle” leases, which are simply manifestations of fraud
and theft (Gandossy and Sonnenfeld, 2005). They go on to explain that such an approach
using language makes the “…subject matter somehow more acceptable”.
There are several solutions to groupthink suggested by Gandossy and Sonnenfeld
(2005). First, vital information must be shared among managers in advance so as to allow
the absorption of the situation and allow for corrective action before the problems
escalate. Second, factions and in groups within corporations should not exist, instead, a
sense of team involvement and governance should be instilled within the corporate
culture. Third, newer executives and those that have been with the company a longer time
should be mixed together rather than be allowed to form subgroups or cliques, so as to
diversify perspectives and avoid a one- way- to- go mindset.
The authors also cite DeCelles and Pfarrer (2004), who suggest that when the
charismatic leadership style joins forces with efforts of maximizing shareholder value,
corruption becomes more likely (p. 11). Charisma is a positive quality for a leader to
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have, in terms of attracting “external support” for a firm, for example, outside investors,
due to the likeability factor, however, it is more indicative of higher CEO compensation
packages as opposed to better company performance, according to a study by Professors
Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli, Waldman, and Yammarino (2004). Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick
suggest the following in order to revamp leadership and its affect on corporate
governance:
*Making formal appointments to roles such as chief risk officer;
*Centralizing key risk management activities in a corporate department;
*Planning a balance of competencies and experience in executive teams; and
*Developing and coaching executives.
In addition, the authors cite Professors Grojean, Resick, Dickson, and Smith
(2004) and their suggestions for building an ethical climate and preventing against
unethical leadership:
(1) Using values-based leadership;
(2) Setting an example;
(3) Establishing clear expectations of ethical conduct
(4) Providing feedback, coaching, and support regarding ethical behavior;
(5) Recognizing and rewarding behaviors that support organizational values;
(6) Being aware of individual differences among subordinates; and
(7) Establishing leadership training and mentoring.
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Alignment refers to the ability “to align key functions and their responsibilities in
the face of rapidly changing environments”, a element that Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick
assert can result in coordination, performance and financial problems if not regarded
sufficiently. As mentioned earlier, the advent of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), the Turnbell
Report, and other measures in recent years are aimed at strengthening the alignment
among corporate governance, financial reporting, and risk management. Achieving
alignment can be made possible by resolving conflict between functions, and eliminating
unnecessary overlaps among jobs and areas of responsibility, as well as minimizing any
gaps in responsibility and accountability. According to Drew, Kelley and Kendrick,
alignment can be aided by:
*Ensuring strategy-making processes align performance objectives with risk propensity
and regulatory demands of the firm;
*Aligning organizational changes and structural redesign with regulatory compliance and
desired ethical standards of behavior;
*Designing new information and knowledge management systems to support enterprise
risk management;
*Creating new senior management integrating roles; and
*Training and developing managers to raise awareness about risk and compliance issues
throughout the organization.
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The fourth element of corporate governance discussed by Drew, Kelley, and
Kendrick is that of systems. Effective control systems help senior executives better
monitor and assess whether or not organizational risk is being managed properly or not,
due to the information they provide. Systems should be able to identify, analyze, forecast,
and manage a wide range of business and strategic risks, according to Drew, Kelley, and
Kendrick. Therefore, automation, streamlining, increased uniformity in controls, and
accountability by process owners help improve systems by improving the usefulness of
and efficiency in which vast amounts of information are organized, viewed, understood,
and thereby used. Some improvements and investments in systems, suggested by Farrell
(2004, p.12), are:
*Establishing a risk framework and common risk vocabulary
*Establishing and maintaining a chief risk officer or risk committee;
*Measuring and monitoring continuously; and
*Updating the risk assessment framework periodically.
Finally, the element of structure relative to corporate governance is discussed by
the authors. Board composition may seriously impact the way executives view
themselves, and their roles, and what they are able to get away with versus the behavior
to which they should behave in accordance. According to Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick,
“the potential for abuse of power and need for independent thinking have led many
reformers to oppose combining the roles of CEO and Chairman, and having large
numbers of insiders on boards”. Gandossy and Sonnenfeld (2005) suggest alternating role

Saad 13
playing of both the devil’s advocate and enthusiasts, so that no one is trapped in one rigid
predetermined pattern of behavior, thinking, and therefore management approach.
Another suggestion that the authors offer regarding the element of board structure relative
to achieving strong corporate governance is to avoid adding members to the corporation’s
board who join numerous and various boards just for the sake of collecting these
positions, since such a commitment now requires about 200 hours per year; four should
be the limit, unless the candidate is also employed.
The authors also cite a research finding by Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma (2004)
that finds a significant correlation between board composition and the structure of board
oversight committees and the incidence of corporate fraud. Conversely, the more
independent outside board directors represented on a board, as well as its audit and
compensation committees, the less incidence of corporate fraud. While there is an
extreme need to disabuse senior executives of their greed and taking advantage of power,
and promote the idea of independent thinking, Professor Collins (1997) suggests
participatory and democratic management systems versus autocratic. The following are
suggestions by Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick:
*Understanding the changing nature of risk organizations face as they grow and evolve;
*Understanding how major structural transformations lead to changes in strategic risk
exposure; and
*Designing improved strategic risk management practices into structural change
programs.
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3. Enforcement as a means to strong corporate governance
Berglof and Claessens explore the topic of enforcement and good corporate
governance in developing countries and transition economies, and point out that more
than regulation and laws, enforcement is “key to creating an effective business
environment and good corporate governance” (2006). However, this all depends on the
enforcement environment, which in developing countries can be problematic, affecting
things such as external financing due to the risk of default.
Berglof and Claessens find that the mere presence of anti insider trading laws, for
example, is not sufficient in explaining the turnover of CEOS; the extent to which they
are enforceable is far more important. According to Berglof and Claessens, some laws are
more easily enforced than others, so that the enforcement environment shapes what laws
are preferable and the nature of how the law is written may also influence the breadth for
enforcement.
Weak enforcement environments influence ownership, control and how different
corporate governance aspects function, because a firm that is unable to follow through
with its loan agreements for example would need to compensate by involving insider
control and ownership concentration in few hands, as a form of collateral for the person
staking a company in a weak enforcement environment. There are several types of
enforcement: private ordering initiative, private enforcement of the law, public
enforcement, and state control (Djankov and others 2003).
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Private ordering initiatives take place in the absence of laws and courts or other
public enforcement institutions; they can be unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral.
Unilateral enforcement mechanisms “involve efforts by individual firms to improve their
commitment power”, which would be ideally done through the firm’s own actions by
creating valuable assets that would be lost should earlier agreements and standards be
violated, the prime example given by Berglof and Claessens being reputation built via
costly advertising.
Another type of unilateral enforcement mechanism is investment strategy that is
only lucrative as long as the firm continues to be able to receive external financing.
Private enforcement involves private agents take advantage of regulations and laws in
order to take action against deviations from contracts, using the state to enforce legal
judgment; this naturally requires the public law to be effective, and the laws and
regulations need private enforcement. Public enforcement is enforcement carried out by
the government law. In such situations, enforcement is shaped by the environment, and so
if regulators are paid little, this may be counterproductive and instead provide incentive
for more corruption in developing countries.
4. Corporate governance from the investors’ perspectives
According to Monks and Minow (1995, p. 297), global companies are in need of
capital, and likewise, there are countries who are eager to provide such capital to these
companies. While investors are focused on the growth potential for their investments,
part of this vision of growth potential, or lack thereof, comes from the confidence that the
company’s corporate governance practices instill in the investor. Monks and Minow list
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several criteria by which investors may or may not feel assured in terms of the firm’s
actions or practices:
•

an effective legal and regulatory system that minimizes the chances that their
capital will be squandered or stolen (especially if they are minority shareholders)

•

a board of directors who are genuinely vigilant protectors of shareholder interests
and value;

•

properly audited accounts that give a real view of the company’s performance;

•

a fair voting process that allows them to be consulted before major corporate
decisions are taken;

•

corporate reporting that offers a real-world view of the company’s future
prospects;

•

the freedom to sell their shares to the highest bidder.

In other words, “…investors demand transparency and accountability in return for their
capital” (Monks and Minow, 1995).
5. International culture
One of the most undermined yet significant factors in shaping corporate
governance systems has been the role of ethnic culture. As we witness the ever increasing
momentum of globalization, and countries continue to collaborate and leverage resources
and best practices off of one another, there is the need to understand the cultures of others
and therefore the implications that the many variations and values present in terms of
business practices, and more importantly for the purposes of this paper, the ability to
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achieve strong corporate governance across various cultures and the implications that
may arise due to cultural differences.
Jeswald W. Salacuse raises the question of whether or not this obvious difference
in corporate governance systems across the globe introduces opportunity for
convergence, cooperation, or conflict. As pointed out by Licht, Goldschmidt, and
Schwartz, “…national culture may impede reform and may induce path dependence in
corporate governance systems” (2005). They also state that culture may influence lawmaking in two ways: cultural values can encourage lawmakers and interest groups to
favor particular legal arrangements as opposed to others; second, culture may retard
reforms that are misaligned with prevailing cultural values. It is because of this that
culture is referred to as the mother of all path dependencies. This is understandable, for it
is a challenging task to be raised and molded by one set of values and suddenly face the
task of having to adopt another, completely different set of foreign values; of course, this
is impractical and is not at all a solution to the concern of culture and the role it plays in
gaining strong corporate governance among firms globally.
Salacuse defines culture as “an integrated pattern of basic assumptions, values and
artifacts that sets the stage for action, belief and policy” (1999). In his 2003 article, he
defines it as “…the socially transmitted behavior patterns, attitudes, norms and values of
a given community”. He asserts that culture has two social functions:
*to permit a community or organization to survive and adapt to the external environment
and;
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*to integrate its internal processes and personnel to ensure its capacity to survive and
adapt.
Pierre Bourdieu defines culture as referring to “…the complex of meanings, symbols, and
assumptions about what is good or bad, legitimate or illegitimate that underlie the
prevailing practices and norms in a society” (1994). Hofstede defines culture as “…a
people’s acquired pattern of thinking, feeling and acting” (Sison, 2000). However diverse
and distinct cultures may be, in terms of their values, norms, and belief systems, there are
some areas that overlap among cultures, where values have quite close, universal, and
similar meanings across cultures, as in studies by Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz
using 56 values of guiding principles, of which 45 shared similar understanding.
There are several ways to classify aspects of culture, and one of the most well
known is that of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions: individualism/collectivism, high
uncertainty avoidance/low uncertainty avoidance, high power distance/low power
distance, masculinity/femininity, and long-term orientation/short-term orientation. The
first set of dimensions, individualism and collectivism, refer to the relationship between
an individual and his or her fellow members of a society or cultural group. Individualistic
cultures are more concerned with individual goals, and are loosely interconnected with
their other cultural or social group members. Individual rights are seen as important, and
rules ensure independence and freedom of speech. There is no need or desire to conform
to the rest of society, and people do things on their own and rely on their selves, as
opposed to depend on others. To depend on anyone is shameful in individualistic
cultures.
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Individualism focuses on the individual as the central role, and is seen in
American culture, the most individualistic country according to Hofstede’s study (scoring
a 91 out of 100), through the emphasis on individual rights and individual legal remedies
to secure such rights. Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz mention that “…a national
culture that promotes assertiveness in reconciling conflicting interests and that promotes
tolerance for the uncertainty this creates is consistent with using litigation to deal with
economic conflicts” (2005). Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz also state that
individualism legitimizes the pursuit of personal interests as opposed to the decisions and
interests of others (2005).
Collectivistic cultures put the goals of their group (family, company, et cetera)
before their own individual goals, and are more closely knit with the other members of
their groups. There is a wider use of the “we” versus the “me” mentality. People of such
cultures are encouraged to conform to the rest of society, act in the best interests of the
group’s goals, and refrain from saying or doing anything that contradicts the group
norms. Group, family, or rights for the common good are far more important than
individual rights in collectivistic societies. Standing out and being independent is
shameful, and members of collectivistic societies are expected to work together and
cooperate.
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent to which members of a society deal
with or how they view uncertainty. High uncertainty avoidance cultures will tend to take
steps to reduce uncertainty, because their culture has taught them to try to control
uncertainty by learning about it and providing information. Usually, high uncertainty
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avoidance cultures try to avoid risk in business. Populations of high uncertainty
avoidance cultures are usually ethnically homogenous and tend to have a negative view
of foreigners. Citizens of such cultures tend to criticize their own nations. However, low
uncertainty avoidance cultures are socialized into accepting uncertainty, and so they do
not take any measures to reduce any existing uncertainty. Therefore, low uncertainty
avoidance cultures tend to incorporate risk into and value risk in their business. Low
uncertainty avoidance cultures tend to be more ethnically diverse and encourage
assimilation. Citizens are usually proud of their nation in such cultures. In addition, low
uncertainty avoidance is associated with the tendency of constituencies to challenge one
another, via public media and courts or meetings.
Power distance refers to how a society responds to the unequal distribution of
power and hierarchy, and the extent to which society members may or may not feel
threatened by this unequal distribution of power. According to Licht, Goldschmidt, and
Schwartz, power distance plays a role in how power within an organization is exercised.
High power distance cultures are aware of and hold respect for the distance between one
member and another, such as a manager and executive in a corporation, and recognize a
boundary that accords a particular behavior for such people. In a high power distance
culture, if something goes wrong, it is usually blamed on the employee and not the
executive. In high power distance cultures, important work is not often given to
subordinates, and a supervisor is expected to show his authority. Power is granted to
those who control uncertainty, and high power distance cultures also tend to view conflict
within the organization as unnatural.
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In low power distance cultures, people do not view unequal distribution of power
as a big deal and therefore see no need to behave in a way that widens or accommodates
any power gap between two people. In low power distance cultures, if something goes
wrong, the superior is blamed for his or her unrealistic expectations. Also, in low power
distance cultures, subordinates may be trusted with important work, giving them the
opportunity to show initiative and their skill sets, and therefore, get promoted more
quickly than someone in a high power distance culture. Superiors in a low power distance
culture are expected to treat subordinates with respect and equally. Masculine societies
are characterized by clearly defined social gender roles, while feminine societies tend to
consist of overlapping social roles. Masculine cultures focus on achievement, wealth,
expansion and war. Manufacturing and business are seen as more important than arts and
healing. Conflicts in such cultures are usually solved by aggression. Business
professionals in masculine societies work long hours and do not vacation much. In
femine cultures, relationships, nurturance, environmental protection, and quality of life
are priorities. Arts and healing are more important than manufacturing and business.
Unlike masculine societies, feminine societies resolve conflict through negotiation,
agression being a last resort. Business professionals in a feminine culture tend to work
shorter hours and use their vacation time.
Long-term orientation and short-term orientation simply deal with the time
orientation and foresight of cultures. According to Salacuse, a culture’s preference for
individualism or collectivism is a value preference that “can have profound impact on a
wide range of systems from compensation to decision making”.
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5.1 International cultural values of emotion
Ethnic culture plays a tremendous role in shaping and guiding a group of people’s
belief system, and therefore, behavior patterns, as a result of the values that a culture
instills within its members, at large. Velayutham and Perera (2004) discuss the influence
of emotions and culture on accountability and governance, specifically noting the two
cultural emotions of guilt and shame and how various groups interpret and transcend
these elements into their accountability practices. Shame is a common emotion in
collectivistic, high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance cultures, and
Velayutham and Perera argue that in such cultures, accountability is likely to be weak
and members of the culture will be view the practice of disclosing information in a
negative manner.
Conversely, guilt is a more frequently found emotion in individualistic, low
power distance and low uncertainty avoidance cultures, and so members of such cultures
will view information disclosure in a more positive manner. In Western countries, such as
the United States, an individualistic culture, accountability is a method through which
responsibility is attributed to a person or role, and so in the event that the responsibility
that has been assigned is not handled properly, the owner of the role him or her self
would experience the emotion of guilt.
However, in Asian cultures for example, such assumptions about the purpose of
accountability are very different, as Asian countries are mainly collectivistic and focus on
the aspect of shame, through the loss of face in Chinese culture specifically (Velayutham
and Perera). The equivalent of this loss of face is found in the Japanese culture, which
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regards shame as the root of virtue (Benedict, 1946, p.224). In addition, Japan’s religion
is not tied to one exclusive God, making the feeling of being shamed in front of others the
worst thing for this culture.
Conversely, the European culture’s interpretation of such emotions is one whose
fundamentals lie in the understanding that as members of society, group members are to
take responsibility for their actions before God, which would make each person own up
to his or her individual guilt. This feeling of guilt before God is more powerful and more
serious than guilt before others, as a member of a guilt culture relies “on an internalized
conviction of sin” and can “…get relief by unburdening himself” (Benedict, 1946, p.223).
Conversely, shame cultures are driven by external sanctions, and this shame is
“…a reaction to other peoples criticism (real or imaginary)” (Benedict, 1946). Therefore,
the authors point out that perhaps accountability is not the most viable solution for
disseminating responsibility in Asian firms, and that in addition to accountability being
weak in such cultures, members would even go as far as to take extra efforts to hide
incriminating information that may bring shame to the company, as opposed to disclosing
it, as well as hide information about positive outcomes as well, due to the fact that shame
cultures are also mostly modest cultures.
Shame is associated with a helpless self, and “hiding the head or face and/or
averting the gaze”, thereby communicating “deference and submission to others” (Lewis,
1971). Furthermore, shame makes one feel exposed and vulnerable, perhaps feeling as if
he or she is being noted and judged by other members of the cultural group. These
characteristics of shame all involve the idea of collectivistic societies, as they all pertain
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to a person’s view of him or herself and the failure to be in line with the goals of the
group as a whole, and therefore, how the other members of the group must think or feel
toward that person.
On the other hand, a person in an individualistic society would not be as
concerned about how his or her actions affect the larger group or bigger picture he or she
is a part of as much as rectifiying the failure to adhere to the group’s goals, or rectifying
it. This is because guilt motivates an alleviating course of action, such as confession or
apology, or as Velayutham and Perera point out, “guilt-prone individuals would be more
open and ready to account or explain…and tell others about the wrongdoing and to show
others that he or she understand the standards and wishes to follow them”. Guilt-prone
cultures also would tend to encourage others to hold themselves accountable, as a result
of their own experiences with such failures.
Kitayama et al. (1992) concludes that interdependent, collectivistic cultures are
more concerned with appraisals by others more than self-appraisal, whereas independent,
individualistic cultures prize self-appraisals more than other-appraisals. This observation
helps explain why collectivistic cultures are more prone to feel ashamed of errors or
failures in their business practices, and would be more reluctant to disclose such
information even for the sake of fixing the underlying problems, in order to save face in
front of others, whereas individualistic cultures would be more likely to feel guilty about
errors or oversights within their business practices, and therefore, disclose such
information in order to proceed with corrective action.
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Velayutham and Perera conclude that collectivistic, high power distance cultures
would prefer confidentiality, oppose the free disclosure of information to individuals
other than those who are involved with management and financing activities, and enjoy
accounting values that represent statutory control, uniformity, conservatism and secrecy,
whereas individualistic, low power distance cultures would rather a higher degree of
accountability and information discloser and transparency, and accounting principles that
represent professionalism, flexibility, and optimism. Clearly, the lack of understanding
such complex, yet significant differences regarding cultural views toward information
disclosure would have severe implications for global firms venturing abroad, and vice
versa, particularly in terms of achieving strong corporate governance in the context of the
new cultural relationship that would inevitably be formed as a result of such moves by
firms.
5.2 Cultural differences and similarities within corporations of various countries
5.2.1 Share dispersion
In the United States, the number of shares of a firm is dispersed across many
investors, reducing the individual interests and exercise of control over the corporation in
which they own shares, thereby rendering them powerless. According to Berle and Means
(1932), such dispersed share ownership is largely attributed to the Americans and the
British, whereas corporations in other countries, such as those in Europe, Latin America
and Japan, are for the most part run by the state, control groups, or families with
“substantial equity interests”.
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Here, the challenge is to protect shareholders from controlling owners with large
interests in the company. Therefore, share ownership, and hence, voting power in
publicly traded corporations is far more concentrated in Europe than the United States
and United Kingdom. Voting rights are an immensely important facet of corporate
governance, due to the fact that they outline the extent to which shareholders can exercise
some power over corporate decision-making.
In the case of dispersed or concentrated ownership, there exists the governance
concern of protecting minority shareholders, be it from executive managers who have no
significant ownership incentives and would therefore manage the firm with their own
agenda, or large shareholders who may use their high stake in the firm to advance their
own interests. A big concern raised by Berle and Means is what they call the divorce of
ownership from control, which as seen in the case of the Enron disaster, helped
executives walk out with significant gains as investors and employees suffered huge
losses. In the United States, it is the individualistic culture that causes firms to regard the
shareholders as the true owners of the corporation. Great Britain’s view is in line with the
United States, being another individualistic culture, with a score of 89 out of 100 on
Hoftede’s cultural dimension of individualism.
Santema, Hoekert, van de Rijt, and van Oijen (2005) state that “when equity
ownership is more concentrated in a country, the need for disclosure would be smaller”,
such as in France and Germany. Since a smaller number of shareholders are involved in
the market, they are most likely thoroughly informed via other channels. Countries with a
lower concentration of ownership, such as in the Netherlands and Poland, would tend to
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disclose a relatively higher amount of information, in order to inform the higher number
of shareholders. Also, the authors mention the extent to which a country’s legal system
protects shareholders, and the level of enforcement: “Countries with low investor
protection are generally characterized by high concentration of equity ownership within
firms and a lack of significant public equity markets”.
The United States and the United Kingdom provide the strongest level of
protection of shareholder rights. This larger degree of protection will also result in
transparency and accountability, due to the fact that companies in countries with strong
legal protection of shareholder rights disclose more information, because of the law,
causing shareholders and stakeholders to be better informed. Countries like Germany and
the Netherlands, and even more so France and Poland, would be expected to have less
disclosure.
5.2.2 Community v. contractual governance
The American model of corporate governance is focused on protecting
shareholder right and interests, and maximizing shareholder assets, where the
shareholders control managers for purposes of shareholder profit. In European countries
such as France and Germany, countries in which share ownership is far less dispersed
than in the United States, the focus of corporate governance includes the rights of the
community relative to the corporation, or “…society controlling corporations for
purposes of social welfare (corporate social responsibility)”; this is called the shareholder
model (Salacuse, 2003). Where Americans have separated the issues of corporate
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governance from corporate social responsibility, Europeans have combined them in
relation to managing and regulating corporations.
In addition, Europeans and others, such as the Japanese, hold that the corporation
should be managed for the benefit, not just of its shareholders, but also of all its
“stakeholders”, including shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and interest
groups within the community; this is called the stakeholder model (Salacuse, 2003). This
significant difference is a result of differences in cultural values, particularly
individualism versus collectivism. While the individualist culture views the individual as
the end and improvements to communal arrangements as the means to achieve it, the
collectivist culture views the group as the end, and improvements to the individual as a
means to such an end (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner).
5.2.3 Compensation
An important measure of corporate governance in the United States is the use of stock
and stock options as executive and managerial compensation, typically allocating 1.4
percent of equity to such compensation packages.
5.2.4 Board of Directors; Structure
In the United States and the United Kingdom, the firm structure consists of a
single board of directors, called a unitary board system, while many European countries
such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Denmark utilize a two-tiered system
comprised of a management board as well as a supervisory board. According to Santema,
Hoekert, van de Rijt, and van Oijen, in their studies of strategy disclosure across five
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different European cultures, “…in the dual board-system, the stakeholders can get the
information they need on strategy or other issues from these boards directly and are
sometimes even entitled to cooperate in the decision making process” (2005). They argue
that because of this, the need for strategy disclosure tends to be smaller than in unitary
board governance systems. However, more strategy disclosure is expected in the United
Kingdom, which used the unitary board system.
Another board related distinction is that in the United States, due to the
individualistic culture, the role and the importance of the CEO and his or her importance
is epitomized. Americans attribute the performance of a firm to the CEO, the leadership,
as opposed to the efforts of the group as a whole. In more collectivist cultures such as that
of Germany and Japan, the management of the corporation is viewed more as a group
effort, affecting CEO compensation relative to other employees much differently than in
the United States. These cultures tend to view the CEO as a “…patriarch or father figure
within the corporation, rather than the heroic standing that American culture accords its
own CEOs” (Salacuse, 2003).
5.2.5 Social reporting relative to Hofstede’s dimensions
According to Santema, Hoekert, van de Rijt, and van Oijen, high uncertainty
avoidance societies are expected to have more detailed reporting rules than low
uncertainty avoidance cultures. Since high uncertainty avoidance cultures take steps to
reduce uncertainty, they are more likely to provide more information than do low
uncertainty avoidance cultures, as learning and information are the mechanisms with
which high uncertainty avoidance cultures diffuse uncertainty. The highest uncertainty
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avoidance cultures in their study are Poland and France, therefore producing the highest
level of disclosure. The authors also pose that high power distance countries, France and
Poland, demand less accountability, and reporting is less thorough and only geared
toward those in positions of power.
Germany and the United Kingdom, the lowest power distance countries in the
study, are expected to have a higher amount of disclosure of information. They expect
that masculine (United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland) societies’ reporting will
concentrate mainly on economic and financial issues, as they are more geared at progress
and growth, and will be at a higher level of disclosure than feminine countries (the
Netherlands), which would focus on environmental and social issues. Individualistic
societies are expected to demand more accountability and disclose strategy information
more than collectivistic cultures, as individualistic shareholders demand such disclosure
and have stronger legal protective rights (United Kingdom and the Netherlands).
Collectivistic cultures will aim reporting at institutional investors at a very small level of
disclosure (Poland).
Short-term oriented cultures are expected to disclose with more transparency and
accountability, as they are more focused on results and realization of goals and therefore
would demands more information and forecasts. The only long-term oriented culture in
the study is that of the Netherlands, and so a low level of disclosure is expected. While
two hypotheses were partially rejected, and one fully rejected, this study raises some
implications for going abroad and the different disclosure demands of stakeholders in
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various countries’ cultures, as they most likely will not expect the same level of
disclosure as shareholders at home.
6. Abilities and challenges of different cultures to adopt elements that achieve strong
corporate governance
According to Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick, the following conditions existing
within corporate cultures are counterproductive to establishing strong corporate
governance:
•

Unethical behavior

•

Excessive internal rivalry

•

Intolerance of failure

•

Propensity for risk-taking

•

Secretiveness

•

Persecution of people who speak up (“whistle blowers”)

Unethical behavior would be responded to differently by corporations in
individualistic and collectivistic cultures, as collectivistic cultures tend to feel shamed by
wrongdoing, and individualistic cultures tend to feel guilty about wrongdoing. A
member of a collectivistic culture, concerned by how the fellow members of the group
will observe and judge the person accountable for the wrongdoing, will be more inclined
to hide the wrongdoing so as to save the group face. On the other hand, a member of an
individualistic culture will feel guilty, and is more likely to take corrective action and
apologize for what was done.
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Excessive internal rivalry would be attributed more to an individualistic culture,
where members of such societies are focused on individual achievement and
independence; therefore, there may be the temptation to do so by any means, however
questionable and wrongful to the corporation and its activities. In a collectivistic culture,
members of the society are more concerned with developing the self in order to
contribute to and advance the bigger picture, the goals of the group as a whole. They are
not as competitive with each other as in individualistic cultures. This may incline them to
behave less opportunistically the members of an individualistic society, because they
approach their success and goals in a team context and not just in context of the self.
Intolerance of failure may be attributed to collectivistic cultures, where the state of
emotion is predominantly shame because of the need to save face in front of fellow group
members and for the group members as a whole. Shame is a result, in such cultures, of a
person feeling as if he has failed his fellow group members. Therefore, such a culture
would tend to have a high intolerance of failure. In an individualistic culture, tolerance of
failure may be a bit more easily accepted, as one would be more ready to apologize out of
guilt, but would still be high because the individualistic culture is so results-driven and
opportunistic, it may create pressure and incentive to commit wrongdoing simply in order
to appear as if the employee has not failed.
Propensity for risk-taking might be higher for low uncertainty avoidance cultures,
because they are socialized into accepting uncertainty and instead use litigation to settle
conflicts. On the other hand, high uncertainty avoidance cultures dislike uncertainty and
try to minimize the gap between what they know and what the future holds by learning
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and finding out information about something. Therefore, they are less likely to have a
propensity for risk-taking.
Collectivistic cultures with high power distance would tend to be more secretive,
particularly on social reporting disclosure. This is because high power distance cultures
respect the gap in authority and hierarchy within the corporation, and so they would
accept that certain information should only be in a few select, powerful hands, and would
not demand to know. Since high power distance culture superiors do not entrust
employees with important tasks, it is likely that they may also not entrust them with
certain information. However, individualistic cultures, with their emphasis on
independent rights, and protection of shareholder rights, et cetera, would be more
inclined to demand accountability and transparancey, and so there would be a lower level
of secretiveness. Even if companies try to be secretive, shareholders become rightfully
more demanding of this information, especially since the shareholder model prevails in
such cultures, where executives are to act in the best interests of the maximization of
shareholder value.
The persecution of whistle blowers would be expected to be prevalent in
collectivistic, high power distance cultures, where conflict is seen as unnatural. Although
it has occurred, it would not be expected that the persecution of whistle blowers would be
prevalent in the low power distance cultures such as in the United States, as members of
such a culture litigate conflicts, and demand information and transparency. As suggested
by Drew, Kelley, and Kendrick , such factors can be monitored and improved on by the
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use of cultural audits by an independent party every three years, with specific attention in
the audit paid to the following:
* The degree to which preoccupation with meeting the analysts' expectations permeates
the organizational climate;
*The degree of fear and pressure associated with meeting numerical goals and targets;
and
* The compensation and incentive plans that may encourage unacceptable, unethical, and
illegal forms of earnings management
The degree to which a firm is preoccupation with meeting analysts’ expectations
permeates the corporate culture is important and must be monitored to make sure that
such emphasis on meeting this goal is reasonable and not pressuring to the point where
there is intolerance of failure to meet these expectations and the incentive or threat to
undertake unethical behavior. In collectivistic cultures, the use of this measure must keep
in mind that collectivists are shame-driven, and so the failure to meet analysts’
expectations is an example of something that would result in shame, although no
wrongdoing has been committed necessarily.
The same goes for the degree of fear and pressure associated with meeting
numerical goals and targets, as collectivists are very focused on meeting group goals. In
individualistic cultures, there may not be too much fear to meet targets and goals, as
individuals are focused on self interests, an example of which can be seen in
individualistic cultures’ tendency to divorce ownership from share control, dispersing
shares across a large number of people, and not taking a large interest or stake in the firm
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itself. Some managers therefore may not even care to meet such goals, which is also a
point of concern, in either extreme.
Compensation and incentive plans are extremely important relative to managerial
performance and good corporate governance. Individualistic cultures such as the United
States compensate executives heavily, especially with stock options, where collectivistic
cultures are opposed to this approach. As mentioned earlier, earnings or cost savings
performance is well rewarded financially, but doing the right thing often is not rewarded,
and this is something that does not seem to be addressed by any particular cultural
dimension group. Perhaps this is one of many areas in which further work and
development should be considered. It seems both collectivistic and individualistic
cultures would appreciate being rewarded for doing the right thing, as collectivists would
do so for the sake of the group, and individualists would do so for the sake of the
individual reward.
In terms of leadership, collectivistic cultures such as Japan tend to see the CEO as
a fatherly, patriarch figure, whereas in individualistic cultures such as in the United
States, the CEO is put up on a pedestal as a hero would be. Charismatic leadership, a
factor already mentioned, can play a big role in the success and failure of a CEO, as the
likeability factor will gain the corporation the needed external financing, however, the
charisma of the CEO will encourage groupthink and a sole vision with the firm among
employees.
Grojean, Resick, Dickson, and Smith (2004) suggest the following for building
ethical leadership:
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(1) Using values-based leadership;
(2) Setting an example;
(3) Establishing clear expectations of ethical conduct
(4) Providing feedback, coaching, and support regarding ethical behavior;
(5) Recognizing and rewarding behaviors that support organizational values;
(6) Being aware of individual differences among subordinates; and
(7) Establishing leadership training and mentoring.
A sense of teamwork can be incorporated into the firm’s culture, mixing the new and
older executive members to diversify perspectives and prevent one view or agenda from
dominating the contributions of others. This may be challenging in individualistic
societies as the United States, which mainly tend to see the CEO as the sole leader of the
firm, idolizing him or her in a sense.
Collectivistic cultures view themselves in context of the group, and so they might
be able to instill teamwork easily, however, the challenge for them lies in their
perspective and high power distance between subordinates and the CEO. They may be
more inclined to let the CEO push his own vision and agenda, and because collectivistic
cultures do not object to the goals of the group, employees may not voice their concerns
or opposition. However, instilling the feeling that the firm is being governed by the entire
board, and that its fate does not rest solely in the hands of one person would create a
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more secure environment and a more positive, productive culture that fosters ideas and
involvement. Using value-based leadership would accomplish this, and it seems both
individualistic and collectivistic cultures would be easily able to incorporate this aspect of
corporate governance.
The idea of providing feedback is important and very much related to the
possibility of whistle blowing. Management needs to cultivate a culture conducive to the
sharing of information and opinions. In collectivistic culture of high power distance,
perhaps this is challenging, since ideas are not to deviate from the group’s goals.

7. Conclusion
Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz suggest that reforms of corporate governance
are far more likely to produce desired results if their designers take pains to adjust them
to the cultural environment and appropriately assess the practicality of “transplanting
legal mechanisms from one nation to another” (2005). For instance, the relationship
between Harmony and Uncertainty Avoidance suggests that in such cultures, the advent
of a new legal regime would necessitate an alternative approach to the court system. The
way a corporation shapes its culture has a dramatic effect on the way managers and
executives will act and the extent to which they will practice and enforce good
governance themselves. This in turn has major influences on the way employees feel in
terms of their own contributions to the firm, seen through the negative effects of
groupthink, and the unpleasant responses to whistle blowing.
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In a global sense, the variations across culture values are important in that they
provide a guideline or framework with which to shape and form corporate governance
policy reform. As mentioned, there cannot be one uniform way of assuring human
behavior; that would be absurd and non applicable to the business world. However, by
understanding the differences in how our global counterparts perceive themselves and
those around them, we can better understand how to plan our own behavioral strategies
and policies.
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